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A B S T R A C T
As a high value commodity on the market, extra virgin olive oil (EVOO) is a suitable target for fraudsters. To
understand differences in perceived fraud vulnerability between tier groups across the EVOO supply chain and to
disclose underlying factors, the perceived fraud vulnerability of 28 companies was examined using the SSAFE
food fraud vulnerability assessment tool. Amongst these companies were seven olive oil producers, seven
business-to-business (B2B) companies, seven food manufacturers and seven retailers. The similarities and dif-
ferences in perceived fraud vulnerabilities according to group characteristics (the role, the scale and the location
of the company) were evaluated. Non-parametric tests and multiple correspondence analysis were applied for
data exploration. An in-depth fraud vulnerability assessment of the EVOO supply chain was provided. Eight
fraud factors related to opportunities and motivations scored high in the supply chain indicating their im-
portance as fraud drivers and enablers. Four factors related to control measures are perceived as greatest vul-
nerability in the EVOO supply chain. Then, the vulnerability to fraud in the EVOO supply chain across all actors
is perceived as high level on average. In decreasing contribution to the overall perceived fraud vulnerability, the
fraud factor categories were ranked as follow: technical opportunities, a lack of managerial controls, a lack of
technical controls, economic drivers, cultural and behavioural drivers, and opportunities in time and place.
Among the tier groups, the retailers and B2B companies experienced higher levels of perceived vulnerability
than olive oil producers and food manufacturers due to the additional vulnerability related to the opportunities
in time and place, and greatest lack of control measures. Furthermore, the perceived fraud vulnerability of the
company was not only determined by the tier group, but also impacted by the scale and location of the company.
1. Introduction
Olive oil is the oil obtained from olive fruit after appropriate pro-
cessing. The nutritional value and health benefits of olive oil make it a
valuable commodity and consequently it is sold at a high price on the
market. Increasing prices and relatively low consumer capabilities to
detect inauthentic olive oil create an appealing crime opportunity for
fraudsters (Food Standards Agency, 2016). Its liquid state also permits
easy blending and mixing with inferior or cheaper oils (NSF, 2014).
Therefore, olive oil is considered as one of the most frequently reported
fraudulent commodities based on the three global food fraud databases
from 2008 to 2013 (Weesepoel & van Ruth, 2015). Obviously, olive oil
fraud is not a new threat as its adulteration has been reported since
earlier years. In Morocco, olive oil was adulterated with lubricating oil
used in jet engines, which left 10,000 people ill (Travers, 1962). While
in 1981, over 20,000 people were poisoned from toxic oil syndrome
that resulted from the sale of denatured rapeseed oil labelled as olive oil
in Spain (Lipp, 2012; Mueller, 2011). These olive oil fraud incidents
have resulted in actual public health risks.
Extra virgin olive oil (EVOO), as the premium quality olive oil, is
particularly susceptible to be adulterated with cheaper vegetable oils
(Jabeur et al., 2014), or lower quality olive oils (Karbasian, Givianrad,
& Ramezan, 2015). Moreover, Forbes stressed that probably 80% of the
Italian EVOO on the market is fraudulent commodities (Rodriguez,
2016). In recent years, many EVOO fraud incidents have been exposed
(Lord, Spencer, Albanese, & Flores Elizondo, 2017). An Italian opera-
tion led to the arrest of 33 suspects who exported fake EVOO to the
United States (Smith, 2017). In 2019, the Europol-coordinated
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operation arrested 20 fraudsters and seized 150,000 L of low-quality
oils that had been adulterated with colorants to make them appear like
EVOO (Taylor, 2019). Moreover, the risks of fraud may only be in-
creasing due to the growing globalisation (Manning & Smith, 2015) and
more competitive markets. To discern the EVOO fraud, laboratory-
based analytical techniques on both targeted and non-targeted methods
have been developed (Bajoub, Bendini, Fernandez-Gutierrez, &
Carrasco-Pancorbo, 2018). These techniques are applied to identify the
EVOO fraud incidents that have occurred and may reduce their impact
but they do not contribute much to prevention of further incidents. This
actually requires a shift in thinking from “identification” and “mitiga-
tion” to “risk assessment” and “prevention” to prevent future food
fraud.
For preventing EVOO fraud, Lord et al. (2017) proposed a con-
ceptual and analytical framework informed by a situational under-
standing of the nature of the activities and behaviours involved in the
fraud in the EVOO supply chain. Additionally, the Global Food Safety
Initiative (GFSI, 2017) defined food fraud vulnerability as a “suscept-
ibility or exposure to a food fraud risk, which is regarded as a gap or
deficiency that could place consumer health at risk if not addressed”.
Food fraud vulnerability assessment (FFVA) is employed to identify the
weaknesses or flaws that creates opportunities for undesirable events
(Spink, Ortega, Chen, & Wu, 2017). Several FFVA tools, including
Vulnerability Assessment and Critical Control Points, NSF Fraud Pro-
tection Model (NSF, 2014), Food Fraud Mitigation Guidance (USP,
2016), Food Fraud Initial Screening Model (Spink, Moyer, & Speier-
Pero, 2016), CARVER + Shock tool (FDA, 2009) and SSAFE FFVA tool
(SSAFE, 2016), have been established to help companies and regulators
anticipate fraud vulnerability in the food supply chain.
The free online FFVA tool, developed by the non-profit SSAFE or-
ganisation in partnership with Wageningen University, VU University
Amsterdam, Price waterhouse Coopers, and food industry leaders
around the world, aims to help strengthen internal controls of compa-
nies while reducing opportunities and motivations to adulterate food
for economic gain (Food Safety Magazine, 2016). It has been success-
fully applied to assess the perceived fraud vulnerability in the spices
chain (Silvis, van Ruth, van der Fels-Klerx, & Luning, 2017), the Dutch
milk supply chain (Yang et al., 2019), and five other supply chains (van
Ruth, Luning, Silvis, Yang, & Huisman, 2018).
EVOO fraud incidents were frequently reported (Rodriguez, 2016;
Smith, 2017; Taylor, 2019). However, it is currently unknown which
factors contribute to the vulnerability of this chain and whether the
differences in fraud vulnerability between actors exist, if so, what the
characteristics of these company are. Therefore, the aims of this study
are to evaluate the perceived fraud vulnerability of tier groups (olive oil
producers, business-to-business (B2B) companies, food manufacturers
and retailers) in the EVOO supply chain using the SSAFE FFVA tool and
to identify risk factors contributing to the perceived vulnerability.
Furthermore, the relationship between the perceived fraud vulner-
ability and particular fraud factors on the one hand, and company
characteristics on the other hand will also be examined to pinpoint
weaker groups.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Interviewed companies
Twenty-eight European companies were interviewed, seventeen of
which were located in the Netherlands, and eleven in Mediterranean
countries. Based on their obligation on the market, the companies were
divided into four tier groups, including seven olive oil producers, seven
B2B companies, seven food manufacturers and seven retailers. Among
Table 1
Characteristics of the 28 companies assessed in the study.
Tiers Company scale Company location a Product
Olive oil producers Small Mediterranean (Spain) EVOO (Organic) b
Small Mediterranean (Portugal) EVOO (Organic)
Small Mediterranean (Portugal) EVOO (Conventional)
Small Mediterranean (Greece) EVOO (Organic)
Small Mediterranean (Greece) EVOO (Conventional)
Small Mediterranean (France) EVOO (Organic)
Large Mediterranean (Spain) EVOO (Conventional)
B2B c companies Small The Netherlands EVOO (Organic)
Small The Netherlands EVOO (Organic)
Small The Netherlands EVOO (Conventional)
Small The Netherlands EVOO (Conventional)
Small The Netherlands EVOO (Conventional)
Small The Netherlands EVOO (Conventional)
Small The Netherlands EVOO (Conventional)
Food manufacturers Medium The Netherlands Crackers d
Medium The Netherlands Tomato sauce
Medium The Netherlands Pastry
Medium Mediterranean (Italy) Tomato sauce
Medium Mediterranean (Spain) Pastry
Large Mediterranean (Spain) Pastry
Large Mediterranean (Spain) Tomato sauce
Retailers Small The Netherlands EVOO (Organic)
Small The Netherlands EVOO (Organic)
Small The Netherlands EVOO (Organic)
Large The Netherlands EVOO (Organic)
Large The Netherlands EVOO (Conventional)
Large The Netherlands EVOO (Conventional)
Large The Netherlands EVOO (Conventional)
a Eleven Mediterranean countries consist of five Spain, two Greece, two Portugal, one Italy and one France.
b EVOO refers to extra virgin olive oil, the 21 EVOO products consist of 10 organic EVOO and 11 conventional EVOO products.
c B2B refers to business-to-business.
d EVOO was used as an ingredient in the products of food manufacturers (tomato sauce, pastry and crackers).
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the seven food manufacturers, EVOO is added as ingredient to tomato
sauces (3), pastries (3) and crackers (1). With regard to the scale of the
companies, sixteen were small scale companies (< 50 staff), five were
medium scale companies (< 250 staff) and seven were large scale
companies (> 250 staff). Table 1 shows the characteristics of the 28
companies. The typical roadmap of the EVOO supply chain from farm
to table is presented in Supplementary Fig. S1.
2.2. Adaptation of the FFVA tool to the EVOO supply chain
Before onset of the interview, slight changes were made to the FFVA
tool (Supplementary Table S1) to make it suitable for the EVOO supply
chain investigation. For example, the questions related to “food coun-
terfeiting” (Q6/7) were not considered since counterfeiting is not ty-
pical EVOO fraud type. Because B2B companies and retailers only act as
an intermediary to transfer EVOO to their consumers, all the questions
about the raw material and processing lines (Q2/3/8/32/33) were
eliminated. Two olive oil producers produced also the olives them-
selves, their questions about suppliers were changed to customers. In
total, there were 48 questions for olive oil producers and food manu-
facturers, and 43 questions for B2B companies and retailers. For group
comparison, only the 43 questions were considered. Furthermore, the
numbering of the questions was kept the same as the SSAFE FFVA tool
to facilitate comparability between the obtained results and other stu-
dies that used the same tool.
2.3. Data collection
Twenty-eight companies carried out the same food fraud vulner-
ability assessment using the SSAFE FFVA tool (SSAFE, 2016). The
adapted questionnaires were sent to the interviewees in advance to
prepare the respondents for the face-to-face interviews (11 partici-
pants), skype interviews (2 participants), and telephone interviews (5
participants). The duration of these interviews was between 1 and 1.5 h
each. During the interview, the interviewer asked the questions, ex-
plained the questions if necessary and recorded answers and extra ex-
planations given by interviewees. For the other ten interviews, the
questionnaire and an explanation of the questionnaire were sent to the
interviewees through email, and a 10-min telephone interview was
conducted for cases where the interviewee requested additional ex-
planations for certain questions.
2.4. Statistical analyses
2.4.1. Frequency calculation
Three descriptions are provided to each question (SSAFE, 2016),
and the three descriptions are converted into low, medium and high
vulnerability level, and are represented by a score of 1, 2 and 3, re-
spectively. Therefore, the low-medium-high vulnerability frequencies
were calculated from the answers of interviewees for 48 fraud factors
(43 factors were answered by 28 interviewees, and 5 factors were an-
swered by 14 interviewees), for the three key elements (opportunities,
Q1-11; motivations, Q12-31; control measures, Q32-50), and for the six
fraud factor categories (technical opportunities, Q1-5; opportunities in
time and place, Q8-11; economic drivers, Q12-14, Q19-20,Q26, Q30-
31; cultural and behavioural drivers, Q15-18, Q21-25, Q28-29; tech-
nical controls, Q32-37, Q42-44, Q50; managerial controls, Q38-41,
Q45-49). Afterwards, these three types of frequencies were calculated
for the four tier groups (olive oil producers, B2B companies, food
manufacturers and retailers).
The frequency of perceived vulnerability levels for each fraud




where Fi is the frequency of score i (i = 1, 2, 3), Sij is the number of
observations which get score i in group j (j = 43 or 48 individual
questions, three individual key elements and six individual fraud factor
categories), and Gj is the total number of observations in group j.
2.4.2. Univariate analysis
Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests were applied for group com-
parisons due to the ordinal data in this study. The pairwise comparisons
were carried out using the Mann-Whitney U tests. Mean ranks were
applied to compare the perceived fraud vulnerability of the factors
between groups. The higher the mean rank value, the higher the per-
ceived fraud vulnerability. These data analysis methods were per-
formed using SPSS statistic 23 software (IBM, Chicago, IL, USA).
2.4.3. Cluster analysis
The score data were subjected to multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA) to investigate the association between groups. This was per-
formed using R 3.4.3 software (R Foundation for Statistical Computing,
Vienna, Austria).
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Descriptive exploration
3.1.1. Degree of perceived fraud vulnerability of the EVOO supply chain
Perceived fraud vulnerability is dependent on the opportunities and
motivations of fraudsters to commit fraud, as well as the presence or
lack of suitable food fraud control measures (van Ruth, Huisman, &
Luning, 2017). Therefore, these three key elements were assessed to
identify the perceived fraud vulnerability of the EVOO supply chain.
The frequencies of the different answering options cumulated for the
key elements and reflecting low, medium and high perceived vulner-
ability are presented as green, orange and red bars, respectively, in
Fig. 1. The frequencies of individual questions are presented in Fig. 2.
The more prevalent the red (high vulnerability) and orange colour
(medium vulnerability), the higher the perceived vulnerability. Only
35% of all questions were rated low vulnerability (Fig. 1). The orange-
red (medium-high vulnerability) colour dominates in the upper and
lower parts of Fig. 2, whereas green (low vulnerability) is the pre-
dominant colour in the middle part. The results indicate that most of
the factors related to the opportunities and control measures were as-
signed high vulnerability.
3.1.1.1. Opportunities. All factors related to the technical opportunities
(Q1-5) were rated high vulnerability (orange-red > 80%). This
indicates that it is perceived as easy to adulterate the EVOO. It
supports the fact that liquid adulteration with another liquid is
common and physically the easiest to perform (NSF, 2014).
Additionally, the detection and confirmation of the EVOO fraud are
difficult and require advanced laboratory analysis. The European
Commission (2013) and International Olive Council (IOC, 2016) have
established both laboratory analytical methods and organoleptic
criteria for the EVOO characterization. Organoleptic evaluation is
particularly precise and not replaceable with laboratory analysis, but
it seems to lack reproducibility for commercial EVOO, which is likely
due to differences in sensory sensibility between the different IOC panel
labs (Circi et al., 2017). Moreover, food fraud as an intentional act is
difficult to be determined, because potential adulterants are
unconventional, where the current conventional detection systems are
not testing food for these contaminants as they simply do not know
what to test for (Djekic, Jambrak, Djugum, & Rajkovic, 2018).
Therefore, technical opportunities are perceived as important drivers
to commit fraud (high vulnerability), demonstrated with high
frequencies of answering options reflecting medium (orange, 36%)
and high (red, 53%) vulnerability (Fig. 1). On the contrary, the fraud
vulnerability of opportunities in time and place is perceived as
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relatively low level (orange-red = 53%).
3.1.1.2. Motivations. Forty-five percent of the factors related to
motivations are perceived as low vulnerability based on the green
colour in Figs. 1 and 2. However, three factors (Q12/13/30) were
assessed as high vulnerability. When the participants were asked about
the supplying and pricing of raw materials (Q12), the majority (82%)
commented that the price of raw materials varied depending on the
harvest quantity and quality of olive fruit, as well as the geographical
origin. This is in agreement with Santini, Cavicchi, Seghieri, and Bailetti
(2018), who reported that the average price of EVOO in Italy grew by
74% from 2011 to 2016. The Food Standards Agency (2016) also
showed that the average price of EVOO increased by nearly 10%
between December 2014 and June 2015 as olive harvests in Spain and
Italy suffered due to a widespread infestation of the olive tree stock by
the Xylella fastidiosa virus. Moreover, 96% of those who were
interviewed indicated that special attributes or components mainly
determine the value of EVOO (Q13), such as organic characteristic,
high level of antioxidants and special organoleptic properties. These
findings are in accordance with a previous study which found Dutch
consumers willing to pay for organic olive oil due to its production
system (Kalogeras, Valchovska, Baourakis, & Kalaitzis, 2009). Another
study also reported that nutrition and taste of EVOO were some of the
top reasons for most US consumers’ purchasing decisions (Wang,
Moscatello, & Flynn, 2013). Furthermore, 96% of the respondents
reported that there is a growing competition across the EVOO supply
chain (Q30). This is in line with Santini et al. (2018) who stated that the
olive oil business is highly competitive in Italy due to internal
Fig. 1. Low-medium-high vulnerability frequencies of answers of 28 interviewees for the three key elements and the six fraud factor categories. Green, orange, and
red describe low, medium and high vulnerability frequency, respectively. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to
the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 2. Overview of low-medium-high vulnerability frequencies of answers for 48 fraud factors. Amongst these fraud factors, 43 were answered by 28 interviewees,
and 5 were answered by 14 interviewees. Green, orange, and red refer to low, medium and high level of vulnerability, respectively. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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(competition between companies: price difference and oil quality) and
external (the international competition: new producing countries
emerging) impacts. As such, small scale companies have no
competitive pricing advantage compared to other companies.
Therefore, they must understand the typical features of their olive oil
and establish a strong marketing strategy to promote them as unique
and distinctive traits of the product to gain market share (Santini et al.,
2018). These three factors are all associated with economic drivers,
which supports the fact that the economically motivated adulteration is
one of the major types of food fraud (Moore, Spink, & Lipp, 2012).
Consequently, economic drivers (orange-red = 66%) contributed more
than cultural and behavioural drivers (orange-red = 47%) to the
perceived fraud vulnerability.
3.1.1.3. Control measures. Adequate control measures were merely
lacking, considering the 27% of low vulnerability answers to this
group of questions (Fig. 1). Control measures can be divided into
technical (hard) controls and managerial (soft) controls. Hard controls
refer to those aimed at the detection of fraud by generating data and
actual information on the prevalence of adulterated products, while soft
controls are more preventive in nature and aim at reducing
opportunities and or motivations in the management system and the
chain environment (van Ruth et al., 2017). In terms of the technical
(hard) controls, the fraud factor related to “fraud control system of
suppliers” (Q42, red-orange = 82%) was assigned to high vulnerability
(Fig. 2). It indicates that most of the suppliers of the interviewed
companies lacked a well-established fraud control system. More than
half of the participants (16 out of 28) are small scale companies, it is
reported that small companies lack any resources to implement a fraud
mitigation plan (Levitt, 2016; Silvis et al., 2017). Furthermore, three
factors related to the managerial (soft) controls were assigned to high
vulnerability (Fig. 2). Over 80% of the participants and their suppliers
lacked a specific whistle blowing system (Q40) and guidelines for fraud
mitigation (Q46). A possible explanation for this might be that there
exists barriers to whistleblowing. For instance, whistleblowing was
viewed as treason or betrayal in Italy (Dungan, Waytz, & Young, 2015;
Osterhaus & Fagan, 2007). Another possible explanation is that
countries have limited or no legal frameworks to protect
whistleblowers (Transparency International’s Secretariat, 2013), and
the whistleblowers may run the risk of being pursued and sanctioned
(Motarjemi, 2018). On the other hand, this result is contrary to Soon
and Manning (2017) who reported that small and medium scale
companies (21 out of 28 in this study) can more readily implement a
whistle blowing protocol within their organisation and with their
suppliers. In addition, 89% of the interviewees stated that fraud-
related enforcement practices are not aligned across the international
EVOO supply chain (Q49). This is in accordance with a previous study
(Corini & van der Meulen, 2018), which indicated that the enforcement
of food fraud in the EU member states are different. The EU food law for
the prevention of food fraud, Article 19 (European Parliament &
European Union Council, 2019, p. 11), requires food business
operators to withdraw and recall food products when they consider
food products not to be in compliance with food safety requirements.
Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal considered Article 19 applicable
to the horsemeat scandal, while Ireland and Italy argued that Article 19
requirements had not been met, so they did not recall the involved food
products (van der Meulen, 2015a). Taking all of the above in
consideration, we can conclude that there is a great lack of food
fraud control measures in the EVOO supply chain. It is likely to be
related to the implementation of regulations (Havinga, 2014; van der
Meulen, 2015b) and the food regulatory arrangements by companies
(Havinga, 2012).
Overall, the EVOO supply chain is perceived as high vulnerable to
food fraud (orange-red = 64%, Fig. 1), compared with the other food
supply chains (Silvis et al., 2017; van Ruth et al., 2018; Yang et al.,
2019). Eight fraud factors related to opportunities (Q1-5) and motiva-
tions (Q12/13/30) scored high in the supply chain indicating their
importance as fraud drivers and enablers. Four factors (Q40/42/46/49)
related to control measures are perceived as greatest lacking in the
EVOO supply chain. Technical opportunities were rated the most vul-
nerable to fraud, followed by the lack of managerial (soft) controls, the
lack of technical (hard) controls, economic drivers, cultural and beha-
vioural drivers and opportunities in time and place.
3.1.2. Exploring clusters in perceived fraud vulnerability patterns for all
companies
The FFVA data were subjected to multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA) to explore the similarities in perceived fraud vulnerability pat-
terns across the 28 companies. The first two dimensions of the MCA are
shown in Fig. 3, and they explained 29% of the total variance. The
scores appear to be considerably influenced by the role of the company
(Fig. 3a) in the supply chain, as well as the scale (Fig. 3b) and location
(Fig. 3c) of the company. In order to illustrate the association between
groupings and the fraud factors, the loadings plot is shown in Fig. 4.
The retailers and B2B companies (left side along F1) are separated
from the olive oil producers and food manufacturers (right side along
F1) in Fig. 3a. The retailers and B2B groups show relatively high scores
for opportunities, motivations, and control measures (Fig. 4). In con-
trast, the olive oil producers and food manufacturers are widely spread
and overlap with each other in Fig. 3a, and they show relatively low
scores for opportunities, motivations, and control measures (Fig. 4).
The results indicate that B2B companies and retailers are generally
Fig. 3. Scores plots of multiple correspondence analysis on the responses of 28 interviewees a) four tier groups: olive oil producers, business-to-business (B2B)
companies, food manufacturers, retailers; b) three groups according to the scale of the companies: small, medium and large; c) two groups according to the location of
the companies: the Netherlands and Mediterranean countries. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web
version of this article.)
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more vulnerable to fraud than the other two tier groups, which means
that they are perceived as more likely to be victims of fraud. For food
manufacturers, the companies that produce tomato sauce are separated
from the other two types of businesses (pastry and crackers)
(Supplementary Fig. S2). Furthermore, the tomato sauce companies
present high scores for opportunities, motivations and control measures
(Supplementary Fig. S2 and S3), indicating that EVOO as an ingredient
of the semi-solid product (tomato sauce) is perceived as more suscep-
tible to be adulterated than that of the other two solid products (pastry
and crackers).
Three groups of companies of different scales (size) widely spread
and overlap with each other in Fig. 3b. The small scale companies
grouped in the left lower quadrant and presented relatively high scores
for the three key elements, large scale companies mainly grouped in the
left quadrants and mainly showed medium scores. Whereas the medium
scale companies grouped in the left quadrants and they appeared to be
less vulnerable to fraud than the other companies (Fig. 4). The results is
in line with the previous study reporting that small businesses suffer
fraud more frequently than large organisations (Doody, 2009).
With regard to the location of the companies, the Netherlands group
overlaps with a certain number of the Mediterranean group in Fig. 3c.
Moreover, the Netherlands group show relatively high scores for the
three key elements (Fig. 4). This means that companies in the Nether-
lands perceives themselves as more vulnerable to fraud. This higher
perceived vulnerability could be due to the fact that the Dutch com-
panies are primarily B2B companies and retailers, and they are also
primarily small scale companies (Table 1). Another possible reason is
that the level of food safety in the Netherlands is high, but the oppor-
tunities to commit food fraud have increased, because fraudsters are
trying their utmost to remain out of the line of sight of the supervisory
authority (NVWA, 2018a). furthermore, olive oil is always imported
from the south of Europe, which results in a longer chain and more
opportunity to commit fraud.
Additionally, the differences and similarities between the conven-
tional and organic EVOO supply chains were investigated. It is inter-
esting to notice that these two supply chains are widely spread and
overlap with each other (Supplementary Fig. S4), which means that
there is no large difference between these two supply chains. It reveals
that the organic property did not contribute to additional fraud vul-
nerability. This finding is consistent with that of Barbieri, Bendini,
Valli, and Toschi (2015) who found that organic farming information
did not affect consumers’ preferences for EVOO, which means that the
organic property hardly affects its (added) value.
These findings indicate that the assignment to the clusters is not
only due to the role of the company in the supply chain, but it is also
determined by the scale and location of the company. Retailers and B2B
companies have a similar perceived fraud vulnerability pattern, and
they are also more vulnerable to food fraud than the other two tier
groups.
3.1.3. Exploring perceived fraud vulnerability patterns according to the role
of the companies
The low-medium-high vulnerability frequencies of answering op-
tions across the four tier groups (olive oil producers, B2B companies,
Fig. 4. Loadings plot of multiple correspondence analysis on the responses of
28 interviewees. Higher, intermediate, and lower vulnerability scores are co-
loured red, blue, and green, respectively. O refers to opportunities; M refers to
motivations; C refers to control measures; numbers after the letter refer to
question number_vulnerability level. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this
article.)
Fig. 5. Low-medium-high vulnerability frequencies of answers for the three key elements (opportunities, motivations and control measures) and the six fraud factor
categories (technical opportunities, opportunities in time & place, economic drivers, cultural & behavioural drivers, technical controls and managerial controls) of the
fraud vulnerability assessments for the four tier groups. Green, orange, and red refer to low, medium and high level of vulnerability, respectively. B2B refers to
business-to-business. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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food manufacturers and retailers) are presented in Fig. 5. The perceived
fraud vulnerability patterns of individual tier groups (Supplementary
Fig. S5) are broadly similar to the overall perceived fraud vulnerability
of the EVOO supply chain (Fig. 2). The upper and lower parts (oppor-
tunities and control measures) are dominated by the orange-red colour,
whereas in the middle part (motivations), green is the predominant
colour.
3.1.3.1. Opportunities. Technical opportunities (orange-red > 80%)
were assigned to high vulnerability by the four tier groups. The B2B
companies and retailers assigned opportunities in time and place (Q9/
10/11) to high vulnerability (orange-red = 71%), whereas the olive oil
producers and food manufacturers rated them with a low vulnerability
(orange-red = 39%). The EVOO supply chain was described by the B2B
companies and retailers as a complex supply chain that lacks
transparency, with short-term relationships and no information
exchange (Q9). According to Soon, Krzyzaniak, Shuttlewood, Smith,
and Jack (2019), several sources could help companies increase the
information exchange in the supply chain, including their own internal
experts, guidelines provided by the different assessment methods, food
safety certification bodies, professional memberships and networking
with their suppliers and consumers. Furthermore, to solve traceability
issues and enhance transparency, RFID and blockchain technologies
(Galvez, Mejuto, & Simal-Gandara, 2018) could be applied in the supply
chain. Moreover, when questioned about the historical fraud incidents
(Q10/11), the olive oil producers (small scale companies) lack of access
to the food fraud databases, which may result in a difficulty understand
of the historic incidents (Manning & Soon, 2019). In addition, with
regard to food manufacturers, compared with the frequently reported
EVOO fraud incidents (Smith, 2017; Taylor, 2019), an EVOO fraud
incident seldom reported for food that use EVOO as an ingredient.
Consequently, B2B companies and retailers are generally more
vulnerable to commit fraud. Furthermore, they are perceived more
likely to be victims of fraud due to the increased opportunities in time
and place.
3.1.3.2. Motivations. The factors related to economic drivers are
perceived as medium-high vulnerability level by the olive oil
producers, B2B companies and retailers. This is in agreement with
Moore et al. (2012) who found that fraud conducted for economic gain
by food producers, processors, distributors, or retailers is gaining
attention and the economic motivation is the main reason for food
fraud. However, food manufacturers assigned the economic drivers to
the lowest vulnerability compared to the other three tier groups. A
possible reason is that the addition of a small amount of EVOO as a
flavour additive does not lead to large price difference. This, in turn,
seems to be less motivated to commit fraud. With regard to the cultural
and behavioural drivers, the retailers (orange-red = 61%) assigned
these drivers to be more vulnerable to commit fraud than the other
three tier groups (orange-red < 50%). This is mainly due to a lack of
confidence in their suppliers (Supplementary Fig. S5). Similarly, the
lack of confidence in their suppliers also appeared in the milk supply
chain (Yang et al., 2019). The result reveals a weak interaction between
the companies and their suppliers. Furthermore, a lack of information
and knowledge sharing with other tier groups (including their
suppliers) may increase food vulnerability (Soon et al., 2019).
Consequently, the retailers (orange-red = 64%) assigned high
vulnerability scores to fraud factors associated with motivations,
followed by olive oil producers (orange-red = 57%), B2B companies
(orange-red = 54%), and eventually the food manufacturers (orange-
red = 44%).
3.1.3.3. Control measures. Most of the retailers and B2B companies
(orange-red > 80%) stated that they predominantly lack technical
controls (i.e. a fraud monitoring system, tracking and tracing system
and contingency plan). Only ~60% of the responses coming from the
olive oil producers and food manufacturers are in line with this
statement. It is possible that the specialised trained counter-fraud
staff is rarely employed within the food industry (Soon et al., 2019),
which results in a weak fraud control system. Moreover, B2B companies
(orange-red = 87%) were more vulnerable to commit fraud due to a
lack of managerial controls. All the B2B companies in this study were
small scale companies, while small businesses do not have the resources
to map out the dangers of food fraud in their supply chain (Levitt, 2016;
Silvis et al., 2017). Hence, a lack of resources may lead to companies
being more vulnerable to fraud. Therefore, the food manufacturers
(green = 39%) and olive oil producers (green = 37%) have more
adequate control measures in place, followed by the retailers
(green = 17%) and the B2B companies (green = 13%). This result is
in line with the perceived fraud vulnerability assessment of the other
supply chains (van Ruth et al., 2018).
Overall, the perceived fraud vulnerability varied between tier
groups. Since B2B companies are in the middle part of the supply chain
(Supplementary Fig. S1), they are also more likely to pass the potential
fraud on to their customers (food manufacturers and retailers) (van
Ruth et al., 2018). With regard to the medium-high vulnerability fre-
quencies of responses of each tier group (Fig. 5), the decreasing order in
perceived fraud vulnerability is retailers (orange-red = 73%), B2B
companies (orange-red = 69%), olive oil producers (orange-
red = 61%), and food manufacturers (orange-red = 55%). Similar to
the other food supply chain (Silvis et al., 2017; van Ruth et al., 2018;
Yang et al., 2019), the companies in the middle and end of the supply
chain (B2B companies and retailers) are more vulnerable to fraud than
the companies at the beginning of the supply chain (producers). There
are two possible reasons. Firstly, because of the increased complexity of
the food supply chain, when more members (the intermediaries be-
tween producers and consumers: wholesalers, distributors, and re-
tailers) involve in the supply chain, more uncertainties accrue (Lamarre
& Pergler, 2009; Ting, Tse, Ho, Chung, & Pang, 2014) and the like-
lihood of food fraud increases (Manning et al., 2015). Thus, B2B com-
panies and retailers are more vulnerable to fraud. Secondly, considering
their reputation and that they are easily traced through the origin place
on the package, the olive oil producers and food manufacturers are
more likely to present a positive outlook. Therefore, when questioned
about the likelihood of being affected by food fraud, they possibly say
that “It won't happen to us” (Soon et al., 2019; Weinstein, 1984).
3.2. Statistical evaluation: effect of group characteristics on perceived fraud
vulnerability
3.2.1. The role of the companies
Five factors revealing significant differences (Mann-Whitney U test,
p < 0.05) between tier groups are shown in Table 2, including two
motivation related fraud factors (Q22, the ethical business culture of
suppliers; Q24, victimization of suppliers), and three internal control
measures related fraud factors (Q36, information system; Q37, tracking
and tracing system; Q39, ethical code of conduct). Specifically, retailers
show less confidence in their suppliers than other three tier groups
(Q22/24). This is in line with previous research, which showed that
external frauds occurred at their suppliers were reported more fre-
quently than internal frauds occurred at the companies themselves due
to less stringent control and preventive measures (Manning, 2016) and
increased awareness of food fraud in the supply chain (Soon et al.,
2019). In addition, all retailers and B2B companies showed a sig-
nificantly greater lack of internal control measures (Q36/37/39) than
the other two tier groups. This is in line with van Ruth et al. (2018) who
reported that B2B companies (wholesalers) and retailers also lacked
these internal control measures in the other food supply chains.
3.2.2. The scale of the companies
Three fraud factors showed statistically significantly different per-
ceived vulnerability (Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.05) between
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companies due to the different scale of the companies (Table 3). Small
and large scale companies are perceived to be more vulnerable to fraud
based on these three factors. Large scale companies (mean rank = 20)
show significantly higher perceived vulnerability in the factor related to
motivation (Q22, the ethical business culture of the suppliers) than
medium scale companies (mean rank = 8). Since the significant dif-
ference in this factor was also found between tier groups (Table 2), both
the role of the companies in the supply chain and the scale of the
companies contributed to the score of this factor. While small scale
companies showed greatest lack of information system on mass balance
flow (Q36, mean rank = 17). Most of them stated that they only have a
basic administrative system with limited information or no specific
information on mass balances of incoming materials and final products.
Moreover, there is no systematic analysis of mass flow data throughout
the companies. In addition, large scale companies stated that there only
exists a general national food policy without specific legislative re-
quirements for food fraud mitigation (Q47, mean rank = 22). These
large scale companies are primarily located in the Netherlands and the
result are in agreement with the facts. The food policy of the Nether-
lands prescribes food safety control system in detail, but it is not spe-
cifically focusing on food fraud (NVWA, 2017; 2018b). Furthermore,
the Food Confidence Task Force (The Dutch Minister for Agriculture &
The Dutch Minister of Health Welfare and Sport, 2013) defined a set of
criteria for quality schemes that strengthen the private safeguarding of
food safety and integrity, but again it is mostly considering food safety.
Although some general requirements are included in the EU General
Food Law, there is no explicit framework in place to target food fraud
(mitigation) in Dutch food policy. There is even no consensus on a
uniform definition of food fraud in EU legislations (European
Parliament, 2016; Manning et al., 2019).
3.2.3. The location of the companies
The significant differences (Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.05) be-
tween the companies in the Netherlands and Mediterranean countries
are presented in Table 4. The corruption level of the Netherlands (mean
rank = 12) is significantly lower than that of the Mediterranean
Table 2
Fraud factors of the FFVA demonstrating significantly different perceived fraud vulnerability between tier groups.
Table 3
Fraud factors of the FFVA demonstrating significantly different perceived fraud vulnerability between groups according to the scale of the company.
Table 4
Fraud factors of the FFVA demonstrating significantly different perceived fraud vulnerability between groups according to the location of the company.
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countries (mean rank = 19) resulting from the motivation related fraud
factor Q18. This is in agreement with the Transparency International
(2018) reporting that the corruption perception index of the Nether-
lands (index value = 82) is higher than that of the Mediterranean
countries (index value < 50). The lower the index value, the higher
the corruption level. On the other hand, the corruption perception at
the country level may activate the corruption perception at the industry
level (Gounev & Bezlov, 2010), which in turn results in food fraud, e.g.
horsemeat scandal. However, the fraud vulnerability of the Dutch
companies is perceived as higher level than that of the companies in
Mediterranean countries due to greatest lack of internal controls (Q36/
39). Since Dutch companies are primarily B2B companies and retailers,
and they are also primarily small scale companies (Table 1), the sig-
nificant differences in these two fraud factors were also found between
the tier groups (Table 2).
Taken together, it is evident that there are differences in perceived
fraud vulnerability due to the scale and location of the companies, and
those two are intertwined. Therefore, the perceived fraud vulnerability
is affected by the role, the scale and the location of the companies. In
addition, B2B companies and retailers are all located in the
Netherlands, whereas the olive oil producers are located in
Mediterranean countries. This intertwining affects the results, but are
factual when it comes to olive oil producers. There are simply no olive
trees growing in the Netherlands. However, in future research, B2B
companies and retailers in the south of Europe could be examined as
well.
4. Conclusions and outlook
An in-depth perceived fraud vulnerability assessment of the EVOO
supply chain was provided to understand the differences in perceived
fraud vulnerability between tier groups. Eight fraud factors related to
opportunities (Q1-5) and motivations (Q12/13/30) scored high in the
supply chain indicating their importance as fraud drivers and enablers.
Four fraud factors (Q40/42/46/49) related to control measures are
perceived as greatest lacking in the EVOO supply chain. Furthermore,
the perceived fraud vulnerability varied between tier groups. The de-
creasing order in perceived fraud vulnerability is: retailers, B2B com-
panies, olive oil producers and food manufacturers. The retailers and
B2B companies are accompanied by additional vulnerability due to
opportunities in time and place and greatest lack of control measures.
In addition, the variations of the perceived fraud vulnerability across
the EVOO supply chain were determined not only by the role of the
company, but also by the scale and the location of the company.
The knowledge from the current study can be used to pinpoint the
weaker spots in the chain in order to develop and implement data-
driven control measures. For instance, once the weaker spots were
identified, then the potential situational mechanisms for reducing and
preventing food fraud in the EVOO supply chain could be generated
(Lord et al., 2017). For individual actors, it is recommended to select
suppliers with care, be part of a transparent chain and implement
adequate control measures in order to reduce fraud vulnerability. Fu-
ture research could focus on an extension of actors. This could concern
a larger diversity of countries including those from outside the EU, but
also a greater variety of nodes in the chain, e.g. olive growers and food
service industry actors.
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